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Lessons Learned: Edwin (Ted) Truman 
By Yasemin Sim Esmen 
 
As an experienced financial diplomat, Mr. Truman was appointed as special counselor to the 
Secretary at the U.S. Treasury in the run up to the Group of 20 (G20) summit in London. He was 
the architect behind the $250 billion special drawing right (SDR)1 proposal, which was passed 
at the London summit and implemented in August 2009. Truman is currently a nonresident 
senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and has been a visiting 
economics lecturer at Amherst College and a visiting economics professor at Williams College. 
Previously, he had served as assistant secretary of the U.S. Treasury for International Affairs 
and had directed the Division of International Finance of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. He was one of three economists on the staff of the Federal Open Market 
Committee between the years 1983 and 1998. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview 
with Mr. Truman.  
Crises do not happen all at once. They slowly develop and evolve. This provides an 
opportunity to engage them sooner rather than later. 
Even before BNP Paribas’s announcement, the system had already gotten to a point where it 
was likely to go into a global financial crisis. The major failure was that, prior to the crisis, 
there was a lot of examination of the subprime mortgages because it was clear that they were 
going sour and that they had tenuous financial structures built on top of them, however, 
there was inadequate information. People understood that these artificial structures were 
somehow vulnerable. However, it was not clear where the vulnerabilities were, how far 
financial institutions had built on top of these structures, or all that was going on in the 
markets, including in the subprime market. The general view, though, was that we would 
somehow get through this. 
There was also denial and failure to recognize what was going on with the buildup of the 
gross financial flows. There were fewer net savings pouring into the U.S. than there was 
participation of European financial institutions in the U.S. financial system. There was also a 
failure to recognize that things could go wrong.  
There were three phases of the crisis.  
 
1 “The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement its member countries’ 
official reserves. So far SDR 204.2 billion (equivalent to about US$291 billion) have been allocated to 
members, including SDR 182.6 billion allocated in 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. The value of 
the SDR is based on a basket of five currencies—the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Chinese renminbi, the Japanese 





The first was the denial phase. In the second, other countries pointed to the U.S. as the source 
of the crisis, and only in the third phase, after Lehman Brothers’ collapse, did international 
cooperation really begin.  
There was a certain amount of finger-pointing at the U.S. because it was the epicenter of the 
crisis. To the extent that their financial institutions participated in the rush to invest in these 
assets, which were of lower quality than was advertised, supervisors abroad were as guilty 
as the U.S. The U.S. cannot be responsible for what foreign banks buy. 
When Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008, it served as a wake-up call for 
everyone and made them realize the seriousness of the crisis. It made all parties more willing 
to cooperate and work together.  
The U.S. was late but still quicker than other countries in understanding the extent of 
ramifications of the crisis.  
There were two reasons for the U.S.’s quicker response. The first was the fact that the U.S. 
was the epicenter of the crisis. Secondly, other countries tended to underestimate the 
consequences, thinking it was a U.S. problem and that it would not affect them. This was due 
to the fact that there was little understanding of the extent to which non-U.S. financial 
institutions and their creditors were involved in this merry-go-round. 
If we had acted proactively in 2007, the crisis might have been less severe. More aggressive 
use of the [U.S. Dollar] swaps earlier might have been a good idea. More pressure on the 
investment banks to improve their capital positions would have been better, especially in 
the wake of the Bear Stearns takeover. However, the authorities, especially in the U.S., did 
not have the tools to do that.  
There were many reasons behind the failure to realize the risks earlier. 
What was not understood by most analysts, observers, and the financial institutions 
themselves, was how far they had collectively built up these structures. There was a general 
impression, in the face of warning signs, that we would somehow get through this. 
In financial markets there is always a tension between fear and greed. This was part of the 
problem: greed was overwhelming, and it took time for fear to set in. If fear or caution had 
set in earlier, the crisis would not have gotten as far as it did, and we could have been better 
prepared. 
Policy instruments, such as the ability to put direct pressure on investment banks to curtail 
their activities, were not available in the U.S. at that time. In principle these financial 
institutions [investment banks] were being supervised by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC,) but the SEC’s supervisory focus was historically from the perspective of 
investor protection. As a result, these institutions, which did not have the capital that banks 
did, were acting like banks but were not supervised. Then there was the problem of mortgage 
originators, many of which were not supervised at all. These mortgage originators were 
subject only to state regulations, and these state regulations differed from state to state.  
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Some financial officials saw the risks and understood what was going on. However, they were 
not active enough in drawing attention to the issue.  
If a similar situation happens again, we will likely go through the same phase of denial. 
However, being particularly diligent and questioning as a crisis develops can help 
policymakers better assess risks and calibrate when to respond. 
Denial and hoping that things will turn out just fine are natural responses. Policymakers 
should be gradual in their response when there is uncertainty. However, this view is 
undercut when dealing with a major crisis. There is a reluctance to take big steps necessary 
to prevent a serious crisis from going out of control. This is probably inevitable.  
It is human nature to be optimistic, which is a useful aspect. However, we also need people 
that are not so optimistic, people who know from past experience that things can get out of 
hand and who can appreciate the potential for things getting worse before they get better. 
The role of policymakers and advisors is to strike a balance between these two.  
In fact, the time spent in denial can be dealt with through better education about the lessons 
of previous crises. It is important to appreciate the importance of identifying and recognizing 
the potential for crises sooner rather than later.  
In a crisis, policymakers must be open to using a wide variety of tools, even some that 
are less familiar. 
[In 2009, I was] at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and I had, as a lot of us 
had, been watching developments in the fall of 2008 as the crisis developed. I was old enough 
to know what special drawing rights (SDRs) are, which is not true of most people. I thought 
that it would be a good idea to have a special issue of SDR. Although my name was associated 
with this proposal, there was a lot of encouragement from other people on the outside. 
I had already written a paper mentioning this proposal that had come out at the end of 2008. 
I, and others, had mentioned the proposal when we were meeting as think-tank people with 
the British before the London summit and we knew it was somehow on the agenda of the 
G20 staff and officials who were preparing the summit. So, I decided to write this longer piece 
for The Financial Times proposing a substantial issue of SDR of $250 billion, which was 
roughly the most that could be done and approved by the Treasury Secretary without an act 
of Congress. 
When Tim Geithner called me, and I happened to be in London when he called me, and asked 
me to come back to the Treasury, he knew I had made this proposal. My piece [in The 
Financial Times] had just come out. He said, “Well, I have an open mind on the subject of 
SDRs,” even though some of the career staff at the Treasury were against the idea and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff itself was against the idea.  
 
[Truman’s SDR proposal was approved at the summit and the allocation became effective on 
August 28, 2009, earlier than most other proposals adopted at the London summit.]  
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The roles of international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank 
have changed to some degree.  
Both the IMF and the World Bank’s response were very effective during the crisis. They have 
both evolved and now have new procedures and new instruments to deal with problems. 
One such example is the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line. 
On the other hand, their role as the central organizers of the international financial system 
has diminished over the past decades. This is due to the fact that their resources have not 
been augmented as much as they should have been. Also, although the world is now tied 
together more closely than it was 10 years ago, its leaders do not act on the fact that their 
countries, and, therefore their prospects, are tied together. The answer to this is to have 
better educated leaders, advisors, and commentators. The hope is that people have taken 
lessons from the past.  
Because of how interconnected the financial system is, it is important to consider 
who will provide the safety net for the international financial system in the next 
crisis. 
The swap network used during the crisis has been rolled back, but it still exists. However, 
the question is, in the next crisis, will the Federal Reserve be able to again respond as it did, 
by providing $600 billion to the world’s markets, or will the political environment prohibit 
this? It will depend on the circumstances. If the Federal Reserve had responded so 
aggressively in 2007, it probably would have had real political problems. Though in 
principle, the Fed should have done more sooner. 
There is tension about whether the Federal Reserve will be there for the international 
financial system the next time around. That brings us back to the question of whether there 
are alternative mechanisms that could fill this role. This raises the question of the resources 
of the IMF and the “global financial safety net” in general. 
 
There is a recognition in the economics profession that the U.S. now has more scope to use 
fiscal policy to stimulate the economy than it did in the last crisis. During the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC), a fiscal stimulus was done in 2008 and a second one in 2009. The second one, 
although believed by some to be too big, was in fact too small and was taken away too soon. 
However, most Europeans thought the U.S. had used too much fiscal policy. 
 
The philosophical differences, and maybe even strategic differences occurred during 
the crisis and remain, if anything, they have been intensified. 
Many countries used fiscal stimuli during the crisis. It is the case that probably a few 
countries overdid it in terms of their debt positions. However, even when the proposal to 
have a joint stimulus was made to ensure that everyone was working together, some 
technical differences arose. These were centered on what is considered a fiscal stimulus, 
whether automatic stabilizers were considered stimuli, or whether only discretionary 
actions could be included, and how to measure a stimulus.  
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Many Europeans, especially Germans, considered using fiscal stimulus beyond economic 
stabilizers to be inappropriate. That view still holds today. 
In order to be prepared for a future crisis, we need to study what was done to combat 
the GFC, memorialize and engage these lessons so that these tools and experiences are 
readily available for the next time. 
It is highly unlikely that a crisis on this scale will happen again in the next five to ten years 
because this was the worst global crisis since the Great Depression. However, we should try 
to remember and understand the lessons from this and previous crises. We should not follow 
exactly what was done, but rather use these tools as a basis, so we do not need to reinvent 
the wheel.  
During the GFC, it was fortunate that there were still so many people that remembered the 
swap network that was dismantled at the end of the 1990s but which was resurrected and 
used in the wake of the 9/11 terrorists attacks. That meant that, when, at the end of 2007, 
the Federal Reserve thought it would be useful to transform this network and use it to 
provide liquidity to foreign commercial banks there were enough people around who knew 
swaps and how to work them. 
This was unlike the situation with the SDR. One of the problems was that the last time SDRs 
were issued was in the early 1980s, for which the decision to allocate was taken in the late 
1970s. There was a proposal for special adjustment of SDR holdings that was agreed upon at 
the end of the 20th century, but it had never been implemented, and most people in positions 
of authority in 2009 had never heard of the SDR. The earlier proposal could have been used 
as an opportunity to do more to promote the SDR. 
 
We should know the history, read what experts have written, appreciate and think about 
what was done in the past so we can be better prepared for future crises. Everything that 
was done in 2008-09 might not be done in 2032-33, but we will at least have a better basis 
on which to think about alternatives than we would without such information. 
 
_____________________________________ 
Dated: September 2019 
YPFS Lessons Learned No: 2019-24 
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